On some issues such as the war in Ukraine, Starmer’s approach is ‘steady as she goes.’ But on other concerns such as those relating to China and the Middle East, Starmer clearly wants to shake things up. Here, he is showing a tentative willingness to separate U.K. foreign policy from that of its special relationship partner, the United States. This reflects an important truth. Namely, that while the U.S.-U.K. relationship is centered in enduring and extensive intelligence/military cooperation, London and Washington adopt different strategies in some key areas.

Take Starmer’s policy toward Israel.

Foreign Secretary David Lammy (U.K. equivalent of the U.S. secretary of state) recently announced that the United Kingdom would suspend around 10% of its arms export licenses to Israel. Lammy said this was necessary because “there exists a clear risk that they might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law.” These restrictions serve more as a diplomatic rejoinder than a limitation on Israel’s military capability. Nevertheless, they are noteworthy.

A Labour Party prime minister, Starmer has a parliamentary base that adopts a generally antagonistic view toward Israel. As the former top prosecutor in England and Wales, Starmer gained a reputation for being heavily concerned with human rights. With U.K. public concern over Israel’s war against Hamas growing, Starmer’s arms restrictions offer an early foreign policy action that is popular at home, noticed abroad, and assessed as relatively low risk. The Biden administration may even quietly welcome these restrictions as supporting its pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to agree a cease fire-hostage release deal with Hamas.

But Starmer’s calculation is risky. Just two months after entering office, he has made himself seem unreliable to Israel. Israel has traditionally viewed the U.K. as one of its most reliable allies. (In April, Sunak ordered the British military to help the U.S. shoot down Iranian missiles and drones launched against Israel.) The disappointed Israeli reaction to the U.K. export restrictions has not been not limited to Netanyahu. The associated strategic consequences of this decision may be significant.

While long-standing British partners such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia may support these specific export restrictions on Israel, they may also fear that the U.K. might do the same to them if they act in a manner that Starmer dislikes. That may affect U.K.-prized defense exports to the Arab monarchies. Moreover, as Iran advances toward a potential nuclear weapons breakout, Israel’s growing sense of isolation from traditional allies may encourage it to take aggressive unilateral action against Tehran. Rather, that is, than to keep listening to the assurance of allies such as the U.K. and U.S. that they will ultimately have Israel’s back.

That said, while he promotes himself as a human rights maestro, Starmer is also hinting that he will maintain the transactional economic agenda that has dominated U.K. foreign policy in recent years.

Shortly after taking office, Starmer spoke with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Much as in the U.S., the U.K. intelligentsia continue to identify the de facto Saudi ruler via his brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi. The problem is that this emotive assessment overemphasizes Khashoggi’s fate in the context of far more significant Western interests vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia. Starmer’s call with bin Salman indicates his appreciation for that concern. A read-out from Starmer’s office described how the two leaders were focused on “working together to strengthen areas of shared interest, including trade, investment and defense cooperation.” For the U.K., the manifest emphasis here is “trade” and “investment.”

The U.K. economy is growing only at a lethargic rate. This is one reason that the Conservative Party was shellacked in the July election. Like Sunak before him, Starmer thus wants to boost foreign investment into the U.K. But this is likely to be an even greater priority for Starmer’s foreign policy than it was for Sunak’s.

After all, an upcoming October government budget is expected to include tax hikes. Labour’s massive parliamentary majority means that this budget will pass regardless of Conservative/other party opposition. Labour’s center-left political ideology means that Starmer’s government will likely prioritize tax increases over spending cuts in its effort to balance the nation’s finances. But with Starmer having ruled out income tax hikes, investment and corporate tax hikes are likely. Such taxes will almost certainly decrease domestic investment/capital formation. In turn, foreign investors will become even more important. Adding to Starmer’s foreign investment interest here is the end of the U.K.’s love affair with Russian finance.

Prior to the February 2022 start of the war in Ukraine, Russian oligarchs of highly questionable moral virtue invested tens of billions of dollars in the U.K. economy. London was a particular beneficiary of this investment, which saw particular Russian expenditure in the luxury retail and real estate markets. Indeed, so significant was this Russian investment that the media began referring to London as
“Londongrad.” This financial interest bought the appeasement of successive U.K. governments to Vladimir Putin. Those governments feared that a more hostile response to various Russian assassination plots and associated antics would lead to an exodus of Russian money.

But that exodus has now occurred amid U.K. sanctions introduced since the start of Putin’s invasion. That leads us to Starmer’s next big issue: what to do about Ukraine.

Until now, the U.K. has adopted a policy of resolute support for Ukraine. This policy has now extended across three premierships: Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, Rishi Sunak. Starmer seems set to maintain this policy. Starmer’s government has pledged to provide new weapons to Kyiv. Of note, the U.K. has adopted a far more risk-tolerant approach in its support for Ukraine than has the U.S. As first reported by the Washington Examiner in August 2022, the U.K. has frequently deployed its own special forces very close to the front lines. Ukrainian sabotage against Russian targets inside Russia proper also reflect British special forces doctrine. (U.K. forces have not directly participated in these operations.) Manned British spy planes also operate more robustly than their American counterparts against Russian forces.

This forward-leaning U.K. approach has sometimes frustrated the Biden administration, particularly the risk-averse national security adviser Jake Sullivan. But whether Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump enters the Oval Office in January, the U.K. is likely to maintain this strategy. For Starmer as with those who preceded him, the outcome of this war is a defining test of European stability. London also perceives its support is crucial towards showing its continued relevance as a global power.

Of course, Trump looms large. Underlining this point and Starmer’s interest in establishing a workable foundation for Trump’s possible return to office, Lammy has publicly echoed calls by vice presidential nominee JD Vance that European nations must do more for their own defense. If the former president wins in November, expect Starmer to attempt to woo Trump by acting as his ‘Europe must do more for Ukraine and on defense spending’ voice in Europe. As an extension, this concern underlines why Starmer is unlikely to authorize significant cuts to defense spending in the October budget.

The foreign policy docket is clearly stacked high. Still, China is the No. 1 concern for U.S.-U.K. relations.

In a rare public appearance in London on Sunday, CIA Director Bill Burns joined his SIS/MI6 counterpart Richard Moore to discuss various security issues. But while both men agreed that China was their highest priority, both took equal care to emphasize the importance of dialogue with Beijing. Considering that the CIA views China through the prism of an approaching war, Burns’ politeness here was likely driven by his desire to support Moore’s need to avoid antagonizing Starmer or Lammy (Moore’s reporting minister). Moore knows that China is especially sensitive to rhetoric.

That matters because Starmer last month spoke with Xi Jinping in Xi’s first call with a U.K. prime minister since 2022. And as with his Saudi strategy, Starmer plainly wants to attract increasing Chinese imports of U.K. goods and Chinese investment into the U.K. Yet, recognizing the heavy U.S. pressure on its close allies to mitigate their links to Beijing, Starmer must be cautious.

He cannot afford to lose privileged U.K. trade access to the U.S. economy. Especially when a transactional president like Trump might be back in the picture. The U.S. is the U.K.’s largest export market, nearly twice the size of its next highest export market (Germany). U.K. exports to the U.S. stood at $64 billion in 2023, and imports at $74 billion. Considering Trump’s hawkish trade and security policies toward China in his first term, Starmer will thus proceed cautiously in his engagement with Beijing. At least until the U.S. presidential election results are clear.

Yet China clearly wants to woo Starmer into a more conciliatory relationship. It wants to see a shift similar to that in Australian policy toward China from Scott Morrison to current prime minister Antony Albanese.

Behind the scenes, the U.K. and U.S. intelligence services and military cooperate very, very closely in robust actions against China. The U.S. considers MI6’s human agents inside China as the crown jewels of this cooperation. And although it is kept classified for security and diplomatic reasons, the U.S. and British militaries have engaged in advanced planning/training for war with China over Taiwan.

These actions explain why a future Harris administration would likely tolerate a degree of increased U.K. economic engagement with China without riposte (assuming it avoids technology sectors). Again, however, a restored Trump may demand a more overtly hawkish U.K. policy toward Beijing as the price tag for the continued special relationship (and a potential restart to talks on a U.S.-U.K. trade deal).

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Starmer is new to his office and still finding his feet. But developing his own foreign policy, he will have to make complex calculations as to how actions in one area on one priority will affect the U.K.’s standing and interests in other areas and on other priorities.

In that regard, while maintaining the special relationship might seem easy on paper, with the U.S. heavily focused on China, Trump utterly unpredictable, and the U.K. in need of much improved economic growth, Starmer has his work cut out for him.