Today, Armenia is no longer considered a “backyard of Russia,” as it has been for the last three decades. As a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, Armenia’s defense and security policies are now shifting. This strategic realignment presents a historic opportunity for Armenia to redefine its geopolitical role, moving away from Moscow’s sphere of influence and toward Western allies. 

In light of this shift, the United States and the European Union should provide Armenia with enhanced military support, thereby contributing to regional stability in the South Caucasus. By doing so, Western powers can prevent Russia from regaining control and further challenge Azerbaijan’s unilateral military pressure. Such support would also facilitate Armenia’s military reforms and ensure it becomes a self-sufficient actor in regional security.

Past Purchases

Armenia’s active arms procurement began in 2016, following its Four-Day War with Azerbaijan. This conflict, during which Baku demonstrated military superiority by introducing Israeli-made loitering munitions and surveillance drones, prompted Yerevan to sign a contract with its then-strategic ally, Moscow. As a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Armenia could purchase arms at domestic prices, and the military’s alignment with Russian standards simplified equipment integration. Moscow, in a show of support, extended a $200 million loan, enabling Armenia to acquire BM-30 Smerch and TOS-1A Solntsepek multiple-launch rocket systems, Igla-S man-portable air defense systems, the Avtobaza-M electronic intelligence system, and other equipment. 

Armenia’s strategic efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities are evident in its procurement of Iskander-E missile systems from Russia outside the aforementioned credit line. Before the 2020 war, Armenia also procured four Su-30SM fighters, though they lacked modern airborne munitions. Another key acquisition before the war was the Tor-M2KM air defense systems. The logic behind these procurements was to establish deterrence against large-scale escalation.

Between 2010 and 2020, in addition to arms from Russia, Armenia received 35 Osa air defense systems from Jordan and signed a $40 million contract with India for four modern Swathi counter-artillery radars, delivered in 2021. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia accounted for 94 percent of Armenia’s imports of major arms. 

Consequences of War

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 significantly altered the regional balance of power. Armenia suffered major losses that, according to the open-source Oryx blog, included 255 tanks, 71 infantry fighting vehicles, 250 towed artillery pieces, 29 self-propelled artillery units, 84 multiple-launch rocket systems, and 39 air defense systems (including one S-300 battalion and two Tor-M2KM units), as well as hundreds of other pieces of equipment. Despite serious evidence that these numbers were overstated, Armenia’s armed forces clearly suffered a loss of capacity. 

As a result of the war, the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which is considered a disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, lost 70 percent of the territory it had controlled since 1994, and Russian peacekeepers were deployed in the remaining area. Yerevan requested that Moscow establish military outposts on the newly created Armenia-Azerbaijan border, leaving Yerevan vulnerable and no longer the security guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh. Based on the Nov. 10, 2020 statement, the new status quo foresees Armenia providing communications through its territory for Azerbaijan. This is Baku’s next strategic goal, supported by Turkey: to get the so-called “Zangezur corridor,” a direct land connection to its exclave through Armenian territory, controlled by Russian FSB border troops.

Azerbaijan formalized a strategic alliance with Turkey, whose command-level involvement played a decisive role in the outcome of the 2020 war. In June 2021, Baku and Ankara signed the Shusha Declaration, a defense pact that includes provisions for mutual assistance in the event of an attack on either party. One of their goals is to open a land route through Armenian territory, the so-called Zangezur corridor. Azerbaijan, leveraging its military, economic, and political superiority, continued to pressure Armenia into making unilateral concessions, seizing Armenian territories during escalations in 2021, gaining strategic heights along the border during intense two-day fighting in September 2022, and later in 2024 conducting “delimitation and demarcation” of a portion of the Armenia–Azerbaijan border in Tavush under military pressure and in Azerbaijan’s favor. 

The recent escalations exposed the ineffectiveness of Russia’s security mechanisms within the Collective Security Treaty Organization. While the 2020 war fell outside the organization’s responsibility, later attacks did not, as they directly targeted Armenia. Armenia gradually distanced itself from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, freezing its membership, and instead opted for an E.U. monitoring mission, which currently consists of 209 personnel with a mandate until February 2025. 

The Search for New Markets

The revision of the military-political agreements between Armenia and Russia stems not only from the diminishing deterrent effect of their alliance but also from the failure to deliver arms and military equipment under existing contracts. In August 2021, Armenia and Russia signed a new arms supply deal in Moscow, though its worth and the detail of its terms were undisclosed. In 2023, the head of the Armenian parliamentary commission on defense, Andranik Kocharyan, revealed that the contract was worth $400 million. Discussions about Russian arms deliveries intensified after the autumn 2022 attack on Armenia. A year later, in November 2023, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia had paid Russia for weapons but never received them.

Various solutions were proposed, including using the funds already paid to write off part of Armenia’s debt. However, these proposals did not address the core issue: Armenia remained under military pressure from Azerbaijan without receiving the arms it had paid for. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, prompting Armenia to explore other arms markets. This turn of events highlights the urgent need for Armenia to secure alternative military supplies to withstand Azerbaijani pressure.

India

Beginning in 2022, India became the largest exporter of military equipment to Armenia. According to our estimates, based on media leaks, the current package of contracts could exceed $1.5 billion. The order includes such systems as the Pinaka multiple-launch rocket system for $245 million, 72 155-millimeter MARG-155 self-propelled guns, 90 155-millimeter advanced towed artillery gun systems for $155 million, Akash surface-to-air missiles for $720 million, Zen anti-drone systems for $41 million, license-produced Konkurs-M anti-tank missiles, and various other munitions and equipment.

In April 2024, it was reported that India would send its first military attaché to Armenia. This decision is linked to the growing military-technical cooperation between the two countries and is intended to address potential technical issues more efficiently. In addition, in 2024 Armenian and Indian delegations from their defense ministries signed a defense cooperation agreement, which is focused on training activities and institutional cooperation.

It is noteworthy that Armenia has focused on mass procurement of 155-millimeter artillery, signaling a shift from Soviet 152-millimeter and 122-millimeter caliber to NATO standards. This strategic change will make future procurement of artillery guns and munitions from Russia nearly impossible, especially given that few Soviet guns remain in Armenia’s inventory after the heavy losses in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

This growing relationship between Yerevan and New Delhi represents a strategic pivot that could reshape the balance of power in the region, further reducing Armenia’s dependence on Moscow and solidifying its alignment with democratic powers. Given the increasing military engagement between the two countries, it is in the interest of the United States and the European Union to actively support these developments to counterbalance Russian and Azerbaijani influence.

France

While Armenia’s main arms contracts are with India, French arms deliveries are getting more coverage. These include 50 Bastion armored vehicles manufactured by Arquus, 24 of which have arrived in Armenia. After the 2020 war, Armenia also acquired three GM-200 radar stations from Thales and a memorandum of understanding for future deliveries of the short-range Mistral air defense system. In addition, Armenia procured 36 155-millimeter Caesar self-propelled guns, further demonstrating the country’s intention of strengthening its artillery capacities and transitioning to NATO standards.

France’s increased involvement, particularly in training Armenian forces and reforming its military institutions, demonstrates Armenia’s strategic importance to European security. By continuing to deepen this relationship, the European Union can contribute to regional stability and bolster Armenia’s independence from Moscow.

United States and Other Partners

In parallel with existing contacts, Armenia is actively seeking new security partners. For example, in March 2024, Armenia and Italy signed an annual military cooperation program consisting of several agreements. Dialogue in the military domain with Greece and Cyprus is also progressing, and there is interest in developing ties with Bulgaria and Belgium. Separately, in July 2024, the European Union for the first time approved military non-lethal aid under the framework of the European Peace Facility worth €10 million. The United States has also shown increasing support to Armenia, conducting two Eagle Partner peacekeeping drills on Armenian soil in 2023 and 2024 and agreeing to send an advisor to the Armenian Ministry of Defense to support ongoing reforms. However, cooperation with the United States remains primarily focused on peacekeeping and civilian operations, with potential supplies of non-lethal equipment. Yerevan remains in the category of countries subject to restrictions on many dual-use components, which could otherwise benefit its rapidly developing defense industry.

Conclusion

The United States and European Union should expand their military assistance programs to capitalize on Armenia’s strategic alignment shift. By providing more advanced training, military hardware, and access to dual-use technologies, Western powers can play a critical role in Armenia’s defense and contribute to lasting peace in the South Caucasus.

The volume of arms and military equipment procured by Armenia after 2020 marks a dramatic shift in its security cooperation with Moscow. Since 2022, Armenia has nearly doubled its defense spending. In 2022, the budget was approximately $700–800 million. By 2024, it had reached $1.4–1.5 billion. Previously, more than 90 percent of the Armenian armed forces’ procurement came from the Russian military-industrial complex. Today, its suppliers are mainly India and France, while Russian supplies from older contracts now account for barely 5–10 percent.

Ultimately, the United States and the European Union should recognize that a more independent and militarily capable Armenia is a cornerstone of regional security in the South Caucasus. The West can counterbalance Russian influence and mitigate Azerbaijani threats by increasing military support and granting Armenia access to critical technologies. This will not only support Armenia’s sovereignty but also contribute to a stable and prosperous region.

In the current geopolitical landscape, Russia and Azerbaijan strongly oppose Armenia’s defense choices. Azerbaijan has actively opposed France and India, including supporting separatist movements in French Overseas Territories and strengthening ties with Pakistan. Baku has also threatened Armenia, accusing it of militarization. It is pushing for the creation of the so-called Zangezur corridor. As Article 9 of the November 2020 statement is the last option for Russia to have a presence in communication, Yerevan is facing double pressure from Moscow and Baku.

Increased Western involvement in Armenia’s military reforms and procurement is essential to stabilizing the South Caucasus region and preventing Moscow from regaining control. Armenia’s active rearmament could eventually lead to at least a partial balance of power with Baku, limiting Azerbaijan’s ability to apply unilateral military pressure. This shift lays the groundwork for long-term peace. 

After restoring its military capacity, Armenia can independently control the communications running through its territory. The United States and its Western allies should support Yerevan more, particularly in granting access to dual-use and military technology and providing training opportunities beyond peacekeeping operations.

Leonid Nersisyan is a defense analyst and a senior research fellow at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia. He focuses on military reform, defense technologies, and the interplay of geopolitical and regional stability. His research interests include Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States countries’ armed forces, defense industry and technology, armed conflicts, and arms control. He co-authored the books The Storm in the Caucasus and The Air War in Ukraine: The First Year of Conflict.

Dr. Sergei Melkonian is a research fellow at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia, focusing on Russia and Iran. He is also a visiting professor at Yerevan State University. From 2020 to 2022, he served as an assistant to the President of Armenia, covering post-Soviet countries and the Middle East. He is the author of dozens of academic and analytical articles.

Image: Vyacheslav Argenberg via Wikimedia Commons