The Kremlin’s preoccupation with prevailing in Ukraine is pushing it to contemplate geostrategic risks and adopt a more proactive approach in regions like the Red Sea. In the past, the Yemeni quagmire had limited appeal even to Russia, a country known for its inclination to exploit crises around the globe. But Moscow’s calculations may be shifting. The Kremlin’s warming ties with Yemen’s Houthi rebels could enable the latter to expand and intensify their destabilizing activities, especially if advanced military hardware changes hands.

In addition to furthering Moscow and Sanaa’s shared interest in undermining the United States, the bilateral relationship could also serve as a Russian bargaining chip vis-à-vis the Saudis. Not only does Riyadh exercise enormous influence over energy prices, but there also are growing concerns in Moscow that the kingdom could become less cooperative as it pursues a treaty alliance with the United States. As a result, Russian President Vladimir Putin finds himself in need of greater leverage over Riyadh, and may conclude the Houthis can help.

A History of Hedged Bets

Since the early days of the Yemeni civil war, which erupted around a decade ago, the Russian government has hedged its bets. While declaring that Moscow only recognized the official government of Yemen, it maintained loose channels of communication with all the major Yemeni actors, including the Houthis. But the events of the past year have caused Moscow to shift its hedging strategy toward a more pro-Houthi position.

For the past decade, Russia had been very careful not to commit itself to any one side in the conflict, positioning itself as a great power mediator in the conflict and using its seat in the U.N. Security Council as a bargaining chip. While Moscow claims historical ties to Yemen due to the Soviet Union’s patronage of the only communist regime in the Arab world in South Yemen, Putin’s regime had not formulated a clear agenda vis-à-vis Sanaa. In practical terms, Russia had minimal impact over the trajectory of the Yemeni civil war.

Russia never proposed its own roadmap for bringing peace to Yemen and preferred to adhere to U.N. Security Council resolution 2216, a resolution favorable to Riyadh that demands the Houthis withdraw from the territories they seized. Moscow’s independent initiative to bridge ties between its competing partners in the region, primarily the Sunni monarchies and Iran, has been presented as a vague Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf. The general idea behind this proposal is to create a forum for regional actors to address all the complex Middle Eastern conflicts through confidence-building measures, analogous to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Russia’s role in such a forum would be comparable to the American position in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, as one of the security guarantors. But this was not considered a serious plan of action by any of the intended regional participants, neither by the Gulf Cooperation Council nor the Iranians.

Despite Russia’s growing assertiveness in the Middle East since its intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, Yemen remained on the margins of the Kremlin’s agenda. This was evident from the dominance of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and not security agencies) on the Yemeni file. Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov has been the key point of contact for Yemeni factions in Moscow, and he was also put in charge of the Houthi file. Bogdanov oversees Russian policies in the Middle East and Africa, and also serves as a diplomatic point of contact for Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian factions, including Hamas.

Still, behind the Russian foreign ministry’s façade of being a responsible actor, Russian defense officials played a non-publicized role with respect to the Houthis. As early as 2016, working-level Russian military officials could be spotted at official Houthi military events in Sanaa, surrounded by top Houthi intelligence officers or exchanging gifts with senior Houthi military officials. The apparent dissonance between the words of Russia’s foreign ministry and the activities of its security services points to a broader trend in which the former provides diplomatic cover for the subversive activities of the latter.

Russia also tried to leverage a cadre of its Soviet-era Yemenologists, such as Vitaly Naumkin, vis-à-vis Yemenis who had a positive experience with the Soviet Union. However, it is doubtful whether this has provided the Kremlin with any notable advantage in Yemen. Russia’s younger generation of Yemen experts, such as Leonid Issaev, as well as their Gulf and Yemeni counterparts points to Moscow’s limitations in Yemen due to its meager interest and its overpowering commitment to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

A Changing Global and Regional Context

Moscow’s neutral stance as an aspiring mediator in Yemen held more water until the strategic context changed. Russia’s deteriorating relations with the West following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 pushed it to seek out new partners for its anti-American agenda. It found one in Iran, which is willing to supply Moscow with the drones and ammunition that it desperately needs to prosecute its war in Ukraine. The Kremlin also viewed Iran with some degree of admiration given the latter’s defiance of Western demands despite the heavy sanctions imposed on it for doing so. Tehran’s regional proxies, including the Houthis, are also increasingly viewed by Moscow as potential partners for a global anti-Western coalition, and their terrorist attacks are cheered on by Russian propagandists.

One of the major surprises over the past year’s war in the Middle East has been the capability and determination of the Iranian-backed Houthis to launch attacks against Israel and international shipping in the Red Sea. The Yemeni rebels, previously seen as posing only a limited threat to their neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula, have resisted international diplomatic and military efforts to halt their attacks. The U.S.-led coalition appears at a loss for how to stop this threat, for which it suffers reputational damage while Moscow exploits this opportunity to accuse Washington of responsibility for the regional escalation.

The fact that the Houthis remain a defiant irritant that undermines Western economies, drains their military resources (particularly missile defense), tarnishes their prestige, and creates policy dilemmas for their leaders is what made them such an appealing partner for Russia. The change in Russia’s approach to global geopolitics is evident from the stark difference in Moscow’s reaction to the current disruption of Red Sea shipping when compared with its response to the 2019 Iranian attack on United Arab Emirates tankers in the Gulf of Oman. Whereas in 2019 Moscow had a vested interest in the stability of international shipping and condemned the attacks, today, after Russia has been heavily sanctioned and forced into the shadow economy, the Kremlin is only too pleased to see a disruption in global trade that negatively impacts the United States and its allies.

Furthermore, the Kremlin identified the Western difficulty to counter the Houthi aggression as a possible area for horizontal escalation with the United States. On June 5, Putin warned the United States and its NATO partners that if they allow Ukraine to strike Russian territory with the long-range precision missiles they provide it, then Russia will consider selling a similar class of weapons to U.S. adversaries in other regions. The Houthis were considered possible recipients of the Russian arms alluded to by Putin.

Russia does not need the Houthis to win in order for them to remain useful — only to not lose. It has since turned this practical anti-Western alignment of interests into a “principled position” from Moscow’s perspective in which unofficial representatives have even expressed disappointment that moderate Arab states have not followed the Houthi example by taking more aggressive steps against Israel.

It would appear that the Kremlin has adopted a hardline anti-Israel position in order to cultivate support in the Global South and delegitimize the West. This represents a dramatic shift in Russian policy toward Israel, because while the two countries were not allies or partners, they did have a working relationship that enabled them to build a deconfliction mechanism in Syria and arrange for amicable public meetings between premiers. Now, Moscow is willing to support the Houthis’ “death to Israel” chants so long as it is accompanied by actions (and chants) that seek “death to America.” The Kremlin is adopting this approach despite Israel’s effort to maintain relations with Moscow by refusing to fall in line with its Western allies’ position on the war in Ukraine, with Jerusalem avoiding forceful statements against Russia and declining to provide lethal aid to Ukraine.

What’s Next

How might Russia’s relationship with the Houthis develop? At this time, there are four main vectors of Russian support.

First, in the diplomatic realm, Russia is hosting Houthi delegations at a growing frequency in order to provide the isolated Yemeni terror group with a boost of international legitimacy. At the U.N., Russia is also taking steps to oppose anti-Houthi resolutions. Moscow has not yet taken steps to disband the U.N.’s panel of experts on Yemen, which is highly critical of the Houthis and Iran. But its success in doing so for the panel on North Korea sent a clear message to the U.N.’s Yemen experts: Putin does not want to appear in these annual reports, and insistence on including Russia will likely result in the dissolution of this important investigative body.

Second, when it comes to intelligence and advisory support, Russia is allegedly providing targeting information and instruction in support of the Houthi campaign in the Red Sea. The Kremlin’s advisors in Sanaa allegedly snuck into Yemen under the guise of humanitarian aid workers. Moscow’s intention is to exploit Houthi maritime attacks against Western commercial and military vessels in order avenge U.S. and U.K. intelligence support for Ukraine in the Black Sea. Despite Houthi promises that Russian and Chinese ships would not be attacked, ships carrying Russian commodities have been hit several times by the Houthis (presumably in error). Still, Moscow believes that Russian ships are relatively safe when navigating the Bab al-Mandab straits.

Third, it is possible that Moscow will increase the flow of its military hardware to the Houthis. Until now, there has been sparse information regarding Russian weapons in Houthi hands. The U.N. Panel of Experts has reported on limited numbers of small arms and anti-tank guided missiles produced by Russia and used by the Houthis, but there was no indication that these weapons had been delivered directly from Russia to the Houthis rather than purchased from or transferred by third parties like Iran or Syria. But in recent months, there has been a flurry of reports about impending arms deals in which Moscow would directly provide materiel to the Yemen rebels. For example, a shipment of Russian small arms (AK-74s), valued at $10 million, is expected to be delivered to the Houthis as early as October 2024. Reuters also reported that Iran brokered talks between the Kremlin and Sanaa in which the parties discussed the possibility of transferring Russia’s advanced Yakhont (SS-N-26) anti-ship missiles to the Houthis.

Fourth, following their publication of a video pleading for help returning to Yemen, it is evident that Yemenis were sent by Houthi affiliates to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine. This arrangement was facilitated by Al Jabri General Trading and Investment Co. SPC, which is owned by Abdul Wali al-Jabri, both of which are based out of Oman. Al-Jabri was a member of parliament of the government of Yemen until he defected to the Houthis in 2011 and was appointed by the rebels to the rank of major general. Since then, he apparently developed ties with the most senior Houthi intelligence and political leaders, and he was even injured while fighting on behalf of the regime. The deployment of Yemenis alongside Russian forces likely provides Sanaa with much-needed influxes of cash, enables Yemenis living under Houthi rule to learn from the comparatively professional Russian military, and may ingratiate the Houthis in Moscow.

Both words and deeds provide consistent indications that the Russian-Houthi relationship is advancing and could, in the future, incorporate more meaningful support for the Houthi campaign to sow chaos in the region. This may constitute a quantum leap in Houthi capabilities in the event that Russia provides the group with supersonic anti-ship missiles, sophisticated air defense, or advanced military industry know-how for indigenous weapons production. These capabilities could make Houthi military supply chains more redundant and resilient, its military capabilities more dangerous, and its decision-making even more defiant and less susceptible to external pressures.

Complications

Yet, despite warnings of a possible major Russian weapons shipment to the Houthis since June 2024, the two have thus far only closed a single small arms deal (that we are aware of); this may point to the fact that the Russians are hesitating due to conflicting interests.

Even presuming that the Kremlin wants to support the Houthis to the extent that it is able, Moscow is operating under significant constraints. In the geopolitical realm, Russia supplying the Houthis with advanced weaponry would be viewed as a reckless and hostile act by the Houthis’ Gulf neighbors. In other words, Moscow would be building its relations with the impoverished wildcard in Sanaa at the expense of established relations with stable and prosperous countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia, which occasionally makes veiled threats to stop cooperating with Moscow on energy-related issues, is an important factor in Russian decision-making when considering major weapons supply to the Houthis.

Russia is currently in a sensitive economic situation in which it is heavily dependent on cooperation with Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Plus and comes to the table with a weak bargaining position. Therefore, it is entirely conceivable that Russian flirtations with the Houthis are also intended to generate leverage vis-à-vis the Saudis, as Moscow seeks credit for not following through in ways that would dramatically impact the conflict. This also coincides with discussions between Riyadh and Washington about a possible defense treaty, which appear likely to continue regardless of who wins the upcoming U.S. presidential election and could further weaken Moscow’s influence in the Gulf. Rather than accommodate Saudi apprehensions, at present it appears that Moscow calculated that it is more beneficial for the Russians to maintain ambiguity in their relations with the Houthis.

Still, if the Kremlin feels that the Houthi distraction in the Red Sea provides it with breathing room in Ukraine, it is conceivable that Russia will find creative ways to help the group while minimizing potential diplomatic blowback from the Gulf. This could take the form of indirect and plausibly deniable assistance, like Russia providing Iran with weapons that ultimately leak into Yemen, or by reversing a U.S. tactic and transferring weapons captured in Ukraine to the Houthis.

Secondarily, and on a purely practical level, Moscow is struggling to meet its own military industrial needs in Ukraine, and so supplying the Houthis with advanced capabilities would require it to prioritize the Yemeni terror group’s needs above those of its own military. Thus far in its war on Ukraine, Russia has needed to import basic military supplies from substandard suppliers like North Korea, and so it hardly seems to be in the position to export advanced weapons to faraway clients who may not even be able to pay for them. Still, if it were deemed a political necessity to support the group, Russia could very likely muster up some of its older systems in order to donate them to “a good cause.” These would foreseeably be weapons that are of lesser value on the battlefield in Ukraine. Therefore, the main stumbling blocks of this cooperation appear to be political and not operational.

From Sanaa’s perspective, the Houthis are intrigued by the prospect of cooperation with Russia and the dividends it could yield the group in the military and diplomatic realms. Until now, the group has been almost entirely dependent on the Iranian-led axis for its arms and international recognition. This axis is led by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force, and it consists of Lebanese Hizballah, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, numerous Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, and Hamas in Gaza. While there is undoubtedly tighter collaboration between these organizations in recent years, the similarity between these organizations (as militias or struggling regimes in dysfunctional states) creates a limitation for the degree to which they can provide especially novel or useful assistance to one another. Diversifying its sources for military and political support would make the Houthis more independent, and potentially more resilient. With the axis in crisis after numerous setbacks in its war against Israel, including the assassinations of key Hizballah, Hamas, and Iranian figures in the axis, Russian overtures could not have come at a more opportune moment.

The Kremlin’s relationship with a radical Shia organization classified as a terrorist group by the U.N. Security Council might seem unusual in some ways. But Russia is very pragmatic and flexible in its definition of terrorism: It has just delisted the Taliban from its register of terror organizations and has, since the Soviet times, maintained strong connections to radical militant organizations. A shared vision of a future, one with diminished U.S. influence, provides the Russians and the Houthis sufficient basis for cooperation.

At present, major arms deals in which the Kremlin provides Sanaa with game-changing weaponry remain plausible but not inevitable. Russia favors the Houthis in the Yemeni civil war, but the relationship is plagued by constraints relating to Russian priorities. In addition to long-standing geopolitical considerations, Moscow will likely take recent Israeli successes and axis failures into account when considering to what extent and how it ought to tie its fortunes to those of Tehran. There can be no doubt that Russian-Houthi ties are advancing, but thus far they appear to be doing so at a leisurely pace dictated by Moscow.

Ari Heistein is an advisor to Israeli startups seeking to sell to the U.S. federal government and a consultant on issues relating to Yemen. He has previously worked in business development for an Israeli cyber intelligence company and served as a research fellow and chief of staff at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.

LTC (res.) Daniel Rakov is a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, focusing on Russian strategy in the Middle East. He previously worked for other Israeli think-tanks and served until 2018 in the Israel Defense Forces military intelligence (Aman).

Image: Antti Salonen via Wikimedia Commons