Since 2020, a number of African governments have distanced themselves from the United States and its allies while deepening ties with Russia and its Wagner Group mercenaries. Moscow has ramped up its security, diplomatic, economic, and information influence efforts across Africa. Several Western African nations have stood out in the extent of their tilt toward the Putin regime. In the wake of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, newly empowered military juntas have ordered U.S. and French troops to leave their soil while welcoming in Russian military advisors and mercenary troops, ostensibly to support counter-terrorism operations against jihadists. 

This is not the first time such shifts have occurred — for decades, U.S.-Soviet great-power competition in Africa was a reality involving all instruments of power. The examples of Guinea — where President John F. Kennedy’s personal diplomacy helped tilt Conakry from Moscow back to Washington — and Angola — where decisive Soviet military support and disastrous U.S. alignment with South Africa helped propel the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola to victory — may provide insights for the United States as it considers its crisis of influence in Western Africa. 

The case of Guinea shows how personal engagement that values African nations and prioritizes their needs goes a long way toward building long-term partnerships with their governments. Already a supporter of self-determination and nationalism in Africa, Kennedy built a personal relationship with Guinea’s leader and provided tangible assistance to the newly independent country in need of economic support. Meanwhile, reduced Soviet economic support and diplomatic disaster accelerated Guinea’s embrace of the United States, showing how adversaries are prone to mistakes, and the United States should be ready to seize openings for increased engagement.

 In Angola, by contrast, the United States lacked a coherent government strategy in its support to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, while the Soviet Union provided decisive military support to the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, as did its Cuban ally. The disastrous decision to align with South Africa deepened the incoherence of the U.S. approach in Angola, while lending legitimacy to Soviet proxies. Alignment with South Africa also highlighted a missed opportunity to advance regional influence by facilitating peacemaking, as the United States chose to embrace the binary thinking of Cold War competition and support anti-Soviet actors instead of trying to bolster Angola’s tenuous post-colonial coalition government. 

The Triumph of Personal Diplomacy in Guinea

In 1961, the small Western African nation of Guinea was decisively under the Soviet thumb. For years, the Soviet Union had provided the country with critical security assistance, economic aid, and diplomatic support as it rebuilt after the dramatic departure of the Gaullist French colonial administration in 1958. Guinea’s president, Ahmed Sékou Touré, had not led his country into the Soviet orbit overnight. For years, he had appealed to both the United States and Soviet Union for assistance. The Eisenhower administration, however, had rebuffed his pleas, with one major reason for this decision being American deference to its French ally. This coldness led to a staggering lack of engagement with Guinea, including failure to appoint an ambassador to Conakry until eight months after the Soviet recognition of the new Guinean regime. Over time, the combination of U.S. reticence and Soviet enthusiasm pulled Touré to the east.

By contrast, Kennedy chose to embrace African self-determination. During the 1960 election campaign, Kennedy criticized the Eisenhower administration for “neglecting the needs and aspirations of the African people,” and he prioritized friendship with newly independent African nations that were also being courted by the Soviet Union. Kennedy’s relationship with Guinea’s president also began during election season, as he flew into Disneyland by helicopter to meet with Touré, who had ironically been Richard Nixon’s guest during his first visit outside Africa as a head of state. The Democratic senator also told Touré that if he became president, he wanted to increase assistance to Guinea and other African developing nations. 

Convinced that befriending nationalists in sub-Saharan Africa was a necessity, once in the White House, Kennedy doubled his efforts to sway Soviet-leaning African nations away from Moscow. Guinea was a prime target, in no small part because of Touré’s popularity on the African continent. President Kennedy combined personal diplomacy with economic assistance to make an opening in Conakry, including sending his brother-in-law, Peace Corps chief Sargent Shriver, to meet with Touré in June 1961. The visit was a diplomatic victory, as Shriver’s amiable character and his familial ties to Kennedy (from a Guinean cultural perspective, sending a family member meant a true VIP visit) struck a chord with Touré. Shriver’s visit also opened the way for the United States to win a notable economic victory over the Soviets by building a dam in Guinea, even though the resulting installation at Souapiti (on the Konkouré River) represented a smaller investment than the Guinean-proposed hydroelectric plant on another tributary of the Konkouré. 

Kennedy’s personal diplomacy was not exclusively responsible for Guinea’s pivot to Washington. The Soviet Union had experienced diplomatic and economic falls from grace that dampened its relations with Guinea. Since it began a robust economic relationship with Guinea in 1959, the Soviet Union had intertwined trade and development assistance to Conakry, and the Guinean government appeared genuinely interested in running the country on socialist principles of development, not merely as a Soviet economic dependent. By 1961, Moscow chose to reduce economic assistance to Guinea, as it believed Touré’s choice to fund so-called prestige projects (such as a presidential palace) represented a poor return on investment and meant little for Guinean economic development. Even worse, in December 1961, the Soviet ambassador Daniel Solod was declared persona non grata in Guinea for allegedly fueling efforts to mount a Marxist revolution against the Touré regime. As a result of these developments, over the next several years Guinea moved decisively into Washington’s sphere of influence. 

Soviet Victory in Support to the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola in Angola

More than a decade later, a much different story unfolded in Angola, where multiple militant groups struggled for power in the twilight of Portuguese colonial rule. The three main parties to Angola’s budding civil war were the National Front for the Liberation of Angola; the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which had split from the National Front for the Liberation of Angola in 1964; and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola. China had supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola during the anti-colonial struggle but shifted its support to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in 1974, and the United States had supported both the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and Cuba had supported the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola during the Angolan War of Independence from 1961 to 1974 and continued their assistance to the group in the ensuing civil war. 

The Angolan Civil War represented manifestations of both Sino-Soviet and Soviet-American competition. Moscow was concerned about the influence of both the United States and China in Angola via the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Thus, while Soviet assistance and backing of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola went back to 1964, in 1975 it substantially increased military aid to the group, largely through weapons and military advisors. In November 1975, the Soviet Union also provided transportation and logistical support to Cuba as it conducted a larger unilateral military intervention in response to South Africa’s military incursions into Angola beginning in August that same year.

Much of the Soviet Union’s decision to increase military aid in 1975 can be attributed to, first, the desire to achieve military domination over the two rival groups, and second, U.S. and Chinese aid to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in Zaire. Interestingly, the record shows that the flood of U.S. security assistance was originally smaller and slower to arrive than the Soviets feared, but it swiftly became a planned $30 million program. This was a fateful decision on the part of the United States. After moving too slowly to respond to the Moscow-Havana ramp-up in aid to the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, Washington chose to simply fuel the counter to Soviet influence instead of pushing for collaboration among the three rival groups, which had formed an uneasy coalition government under the Alvor Agreement, the peace accords granting Angola independence from Portuguese colonial rule. 

While America’s timing on ramping up military aid to Angola was bad, South Africa’s entry into the civil war made that timing even worse. Claiming American backing for its entry into the war — whether this was simply cunning politics from Pretoria or the result of one of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s covert anti-Communist enterprises (enabled by his forceful handling of the CIA and other U.S. government institutions during his tenure as both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor) remains unclear — South African troops entered the conflict. A major reason for this entry was the concern that under a government led by the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, there would be attacks on Namibia from forces of the South West African People’s Organization, who had enjoyed the support of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola in their struggle for independence in Namibia since their establishment in 1960. Yet again, the United States made a fateful decision to fully embrace the Cold War mentality and align with South Africa, while labeling the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola as an enemy.

The apartheid regime’s support for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola rapidly legitimized the cause of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola in the eyes of African governments all across the continent, with South Africa representing a much bigger threat than the Soviet and Cuban military presence in Angola that had previously caused significant concern. In Nigeria, for example, a crowd stoned the United States Embassy in Lagos, and the Nigerian government gave $20 million to the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola. On the American side, Pretoria’s involvement made support to its opponents much less palatable on both the domestic and international political stage, including for congressional representatives campaigning for re-election in the 1976 election cycle. The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola’s ensuing victory and rule, which would be marred by two more civil wars lasting into the new millennium, were both won by the Soviet Union and lost by U.S. alignment with apartheid South Africa. 

Lessons for U.S. Engagement in Western Africa 

The current American contest for influence with Russia in Western Africa takes place in a much different era. Today, the rapid flow of information, global supply chains prone to external shocks, and use of private military companies all represent new factors that were not present during the Cold War. Yet there are lessons to be drawn from each conflict that can inform U.S. engagement with governments in Western Africa that are currently drawing closer to the Putin regime and distancing themselves from the United States or allies such as France. 

First, personal engagement that values African nations and prioritizes their needs goes a long way to building long-term partnerships with their governments. Kennedy’s firm belief in the rights and merits of the nationalist stories of newly independent African governments went a long way with their new leaders, including Ahmed Sekou Touré. Kennedy successfully coupled this belief with intentional time, effort, and (perhaps most importantly) tangible assistance. Western Africa is home to some of the world’s most under-developed economies, and just like Guinea after its independence, they face the challenges of underdevelopment. For years, U.S. engagement in Africa has been notably limited, in part due to the multiple competing priorities in hotspots such as the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific. Just as the Soviet Union took advantage of American non-engagement with Guinea to increase its influence, however, Moscow is eager to seize the opportunity for an upper hand in Western Africa. Washington should be proactive about engaging with regional governments and working to support them in the areas they need, such as meeting core development objectives through infrastructure funding and providing training and equipment to counter jihadist threats. One encouraging example is Chad, where the United States plans to reopen discussions over what a restored U.S. security presence in the country could look like after the ejection of American troops in April 2024. 

Second, adversaries are prone to mistakes, and the United States should be ready to seize openings for increased engagement. Russian influence is not guaranteed to last forever. In Guinea, where the Soviet Union had the upper hand in 1961, decisions to disengage economically and Ambassador Solod’s alleged plotting against the Touré regime drove Guinea more swiftly into Washington’s arms. In Mali, which has ordered French troops out in recent years and welcomed Russian private military companies to support counter-insurgency efforts, Wagner Group forces have killed civilians. As such incidents continue or increase in Western Africa, Russia’s regional popularity may wane. The United States has an opportunity to amplify its messages supporting human rights and humanitarian protections. It can also seek openings to assist regional governments with crucial economic support to meet development objectives or security cooperation to counter jihadist groups. It is true that upholding human rights and providing assistance are not always an easy combination. There are a number of restrictions on U.S. aid, including Leahy Laws, which at times have led Western African partners to choose Russia, given that Moscow does not impose such requirements. But while this is not an easy challenge to surmount, the United States can begin to address it by highlighting the financial and human costs of Russian fighters to Western African nations.

Third, coherence of government strategy matters. In Angola, the U.S. program of support was characterized by a lack of transparency, and perhaps even a degree of contradiction between the Kissinger-led covert apparatus and the official approach of the Ford administration. While far from ideal on its own, the convergence of this government incoherence with U.S. alignment with South Africa in the war was disastrous. By contrast, the Soviet Union managed to outmaneuver its American adversary, lending robust support to the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola across multiple instruments of power, including through collaboration with its Cuban ally, maintaining presence and support in Angola for years after the United States and China had disengaged. The United States should continue to strengthen its whole-of-government efforts to engage Africa and its subregions, including the “3D” approach of diplomacy, development, and defense, as well as the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Continued coordination to counter Russian influence in diplomatic, economic, and informational domains is key to preventing Moscow from achieving superiority in areas such as disinformation campaigns (an area United States Africa Command is already addressing) or security cooperation against jihadist groups. 

Fourth, facilitating peacemaking can advance regional influence. During the Angolan civil war, it was Soviet-backed forces that were the main enemy, and this led the United States to make the decision not to continue supporting peacemaking in Angola by strengthening support for the coalition government organized under the Alvor Agreement, choosing instead to align with Soviet rivals, including a continentally despised apartheid regime. The United States has the opportunity to advance its historic role as a broker of peace agreements by prioritizing this as an area of focus in Western Africa. Increased engagement in this area is also key in an era when China is eager to bolster its image as a global peacemaker; in addition to its success in brokering the Iran-Saudi deal, it seeks to foster mediation in hotspots throughout Africa, building on its track record in mediating conflicts including Darfur, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Rwanda–Democratic Republic of the Congo. Renewing its reputation as a broker of peace, with a focus in Western Africa, may serve to rebuild U.S. standing with regimes that have moved toward alternative providers of peace and security, such as China. 

While the United States has a checkered record of engagement in Africa, with infamous chapters in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Somalia, there have been notable moments of success. Kennedy’s personal diplomacy in Guinea represents one such moment, and his administration’s tilting of Conakry from Moscow to Washington can serve as a guide to future diplomatic efforts in Africa. American involvement in Angola, by contrast, represents a tragic chapter in Washington’s engagement, with the American Cold War obsession spelling disaster, particularly through alignment with South Africa. Today, the United States has the chance to paint a much different picture, one that could perhaps help Washington deepen partnerships with regimes currently more friendly to Moscow. 

Nathan Heath is an analyst at National Security Innovations, Inc., where he supports projects for the U.S. Department of Defense. He is also a member of Foreign Policy for America’s 2024 NextGen Initiative fellowship cohort. The views expressed in this article do not represent those of his employer or the U.S. Department of Defense.

Image: U.S. Secretary of Defense via Wikimedia Commons