In my first analysis and opinion piece on the so-called Axis of Resistance, I set the scene by describing Iran’s 45-year trajectory from the Khomeini revolution to its current challenge to the West and the Rules Based International System (RBIS). In this piece, we will begin working our way through the range of proxy militias that are supported and coordinated by Iran and challenge Iran’s enemies in the theatres in which they are active. The Yemeni Houthis are a great place to start because of the immediacy of the threat that they pose to international shipping in the Red Sea and, therefore, to the global economy. As a former UK Ambassador to Yemen (2015–2017), I have written this piece from a more personal point of view.

The Houthis have long been a worry to anyone concerned with the well-being of the Yemeni people, the stability of the Arabian Peninsula, and security in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. But the prominent role they have taken upon themselves since October 7 in the Axis of Resistance has taken these concerns to a new level. Of the extremist and terrorist groups that take their lead from Iran, the Houthis are one of the more independent-minded. They are capable of refusing to do Iran’s bidding when it conflicts with their interests. Nevertheless, they have become increasingly enthusiastic co-belligerents with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Iraqi Shia militias, and the evidence shows that the Iranians are fully witting partners in this aggression.

Having spent a good deal of time negotiating with the Houthis at a time when I was solely focused on achieving peace in Yemen, I want to warn that this is no liberation movement. Instead, it is an extraordinarily virulent, chauvinistic, and violent group. I recall two moments of brutal clarity from senior Houthi leaders. One was when they told me, long before they actually did it, that they were only in an alliance of convenience with Ali Abdallah Saleh, and as soon as he ceased to be useful to him, they would kill him.

The second moment of clarity was when they told me that they would inevitably win in Yemen in the end “because you care, and we don’t. You care about the deaths of Yemenis. We don’t care how many die. When enough have died, you will beg us to make peace.” Later, when I saw their snipers in Aden and Taez killing civilians for fun—doctors and nurses in a hospital ducking under window frames to go about their business because a qat-crazed Houthi sniper on a rooftop was picking off anyone showing themself at a window—my interlocutor’s words came back to me.

It is worth recalling the origins of the Houthi movement to understand how we got to where we are today. Its formal name is Ansar Allah (partisans of God), and it took shape in the 1990s in the mountainous, landlocked region of Saada in northern Yemen, close to the Saudi border. It draws principally on Zaidi Muslims—the minority sect in Yemen that is considered somewhat close to Shia Islam. However, in practice, the sectarian divide between the Zaidis and Shafi’i (Sunni) Yemenis, who make up two-thirds of the population, was never considered wide enough to be problematic. Marriage between the sects and worship in each other’s mosques was historically normal in Yemen.

The Houthi interest in a Zaidi revival is sometimes mischaracterized as peaceful in its early stages, but it was always based on the elitism and exclusivity of the Houthi tribe from which its leadership is drawn. It took inspiration from Lebanese Hezbollah (and hence naturally from Iran) at the outset: both Hasan Nasrallah and Muhammad Husain Fadhlallah were involved in developing its ideology. The name Ansar Allah is almost synonymous with Hezbollah in Arabic, and the group is equally violent in nature. Yemeni President Saleh was also a Zaidi, but the Houthis defined themselves in opposition to him and his perceived alignment with Saudi Arabia and the United States. As early as 2003, the Houthis adopted their notorious “scream:” “God is the greatest; death to America; death to Israel; a curse upon the Jews; victory to Islam.”

Over the past two decades, the Houthis have only grown more violent and intolerant. They fought off Saleh’s attempts to bring them to heel before he was deposed during Yemen’s iteration of the Arab Spring. When he killed their leader, Husain al-Houthi, in 2004, Husain’s brother Abdal Malik took over the movement, bearing what would turn out to be a deadly grudge against Saleh. Their participation in the National Dialogue was in bad faith, as they were progressively taking over the northern governorates of Yemen and preparing for the assault on Sanaa that they launched in September 2014. The key enabler for this dramatic expansion of Houthi power, which later briefly extended all the way to Aden in the far south, was a volte-face from war with Saleh to an opportunistic alliance with him that caused much of the Yemeni military who remained loyal to Saleh to acquiesce in or assist the Houthi advance.

The Houthi advance reached its maximum extent in 2015 before the Saudi-assisted Government of Yemen was able to push them halfway back toward Sanaa, and the battle lines largely stabilized for the near-decade that followed. Despite taking heavy casualties over the past 20 years of fighting with various adversaries, including the Saudis, nothing has happened to persuade the Houthis to compromise or moderate their approach. They are hardened in battle, and their field commanders have grown used to the wealth accrued and the fear engendered in a war economy. Their relationships with Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have grown closer as they have depended upon both for military supply, training, and technical support.

The Houthis used and encouraged propaganda against the Saudis and their Western allies to good effect: the war was unpopular in the West, and Saudi Arabia came to realize that it lacked support to press for victory for the internationally recognized government (IRG). Instead, the Saudis became increasingly anxious to exit the conflict, even if it meant handing Yemen over to the Houthis and paying protection money to be left in peace. One interesting question to consider from their perspective: Was the international community culpably naive in failing to give unqualified backing to the IRG, and was this largely because of a knee-jerk hostility to the Saudis that is so common in Western progressive circles? If the Houthis genuinely pose a chronic threat to the RBIS and intend to hold freedom of navigation in the Red Sea hostage to any and every tactical interest they choose to pursue, will it become inevitable to try to revive and empower the Saudi-IRG coalition to suppress them?

Perhaps it may be of interest if I offer a few more reflections and anecdotes from the period from November 2014 to January 2017, when I was preparing to take over as ambassador, and then actually doing the job—albeit frustratingly from exile in Jedda because we had to withdraw from Sanaa in early 2015. I should say that those chilling conversations I mentioned at the start of this article came very early in my time in Muscat, where I traveled to facilitate contact between the US and the Houthis, who at that time were willing to talk to the Brits but not the Americans. The Omanis graciously hosted two sessions of talks between senior Houthis and me, which amounted to about 10 hours of intense debate and negotiation in Arabic. I succeeded in the limited scope of my mission, and US-Houthi contact was indeed established well before the June 2015 peace talks in Geneva.

Later, I played a prominent support role in the three sessions of peace talks between the Houthis and representatives of President Hadi. I also reached out extensively to Saleh loyalists and associates to try to work on that side of the Yemeni puzzle and got to know and very much like the current leader of the legitimate government, Rashad al-Alimi. Working closely with the excellent UN envoys, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed and Kenny Gluck, we tried everything to achieve peace but came up short.

The peace talks were certainly picturesque. They progressed from utter frustration in Geneva in June, when the Houthis would not even engage and the government side showed up with an Al Qaeda-associated delegate, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon unwisely decided to show up to force a photo opportunity, with the sole effect of giving the Houthis the opportunity to secure concessions by threatening to boycott the photo session. Back in Switzerland’s mountains months later, the two sides did finally come together, albeit reluctantly and unproductively.

Then came Kuwait in the spring and summer of 2016—the real peace talks that I think may still be the closest we came to a peace agreement (albeit one on terms very favorable to the Houthis) until 2023. We stayed in a comfortable hotel for about three months: the UN, US, UK, and many of the group of ambassadors supporting peace in Yemen, then known as the G18. The Kuwaitis also provided a guest palace for some of the talks. They were gracious, accommodating hosts, but the same cannot be said for their Houthi guests, who endlessly made unreasonable demands, including for a constant supply of qat (an illegal drug in Kuwait whose supply or possession is usually a serious criminal offense). They would arrive late at meetings, indulge in tantrums, walkouts, threats, and recriminations, and would change their negotiating position from day to day. There was a standoff when the chief Houthi negotiator, Mohamed Abdal Salam, was shut out of his Facebook account because of the hateful material on it. Fixing that problem—getting him back on Facebook despite the hateful material—required his ID, which indicated that he was 13 years old. It turned out that he had traveled to Kuwait on his son’s passport.

The Houthi delegation contained genuine seniors who continue to hold significant positions in the movement to this day. But I must record a reflection from a respected Yemeni politician, Abdal Karim al-Iryani, whose death during my time working on Yemen was generally felt as an end-of-an-era tragedy. Speaking of Mehdi Mashat, the most obnoxious and destructive member of the delegation, Iryani is said to have commented that his preferment to a senior role in those days was his own signal to sign off and die. Mashat had grown up in Saada as a feckless and meritless thug who just happened to be in Abdal Malik al-Houthi’s circle. Apparently, that is enough qualification to rise high in the de facto administration, of which he now enjoys the title of “president.”

Nevertheless, we kept at it and edged closer and closer to an agreement. Abdal Salam, who remains the chief Houthi negotiator and spokesman to this day, was serious about the Kuwait talks. He earned the confidence of the Saudis, and the outline of an agreement took shape whereby the Houthis would essentially hold most levers of power in Yemen, and Saudi Arabia would withdraw with dignity. President Hadi would be marginalized, but his negotiators recognized that the Saudis and others would not support them in opposing this outcome. Just when we thought we had a deal, the instructions from Saada changed. Abdal Malik was said to be angry with Abdal Salam’s supposed “concessions.” The Houthis walked away, and peace talks went on ice for years. The aftereffects have been consequential, and many unfortunate:

1. Over the following eight years, battle lines did not move as much as they did in 2014-16, but Yemen has suffered horrific casualties and damage. Besides Sanaa, contested cities like Hodeida, Taez, and Marib have been devastated. The UN estimates acute food insecurity affects many millions of Yemenis.

2. Naturally, the focus of the international community has been on peacemaking, as mine was. This limited the appetite for calling the Houthis a terrorist group until their increasing attacks beyond the borders of Yemen caused a shift in opinion. In the initial stages of expanding their campaign, the Houthis mainly attempted to hit targets far inside Saudi Arabia, with only occasional success. In early 2021, at the time of the transition from the Trump to Biden administrations in Washington, DC, the Houthis were first designated by the US as terrorists in January and then had the designation lifted in February. But when the Houthis conducted a lethal drone and missile attack on Abu Dhabi in January 2022, the United Arab Emirates skillfully used its temporary position on the Security Council to secure Resolution 2624, which branded the Houthis as a terrorist group for the first time by the UN.

3. This was the state of affairs on October 6, 2023, but now the scenario has changed significantly. The Houthis embarked on their reckless program of attacking shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb—and the tolerance of the US and others for such acts of aggression was stretched beyond breaking point. The Suez Canal and Red Sea shipping route is vital to the global economy, and the risk that significant quantities of shipping have to divert indefinitely around the southern tip of Africa has global implications for trade and inflation.

The killing of 10 Houthis and the sinking of three of their boats by the US Navy in late December was a clear message to the Houthis and Iran that this aggression would not be tolerated. Yet still they persisted, drawing a UN Security Council Resolution condemning their actions and finally a series of more proactive US and UK strikes on sites key to the Houthis’ capability to launch further attacks. These anti-Houthi enforcement efforts have continued but have not yet succeeded in deterring or preventing further attacks, although some analysts say that their capabilities have been depleted.

4. Besides the Houthis, Iran has publicly arrogated to itself the right to interfere with the safety of international shipping in the Red Sea and to oppose any international efforts to secure it. An Iranian spy ship, the Behshad, is understood to have been guiding some of the Houthi attacks. However, such Iranian maritime assets are potentially vulnerable to US/UK action.

5. Interestingly, the UN announced in late December a “significant step” towards a ceasefire in Yemen. The UN envoy celebrated this supposed progress without referencing Houthi attacks on international shipping. It may be that this Houthi tease of progress towards a ceasefire and peace talks was a calculated move to play on the international community’s long-standing wish for peace in Yemen and make decisive action against the Houthis and Iran that much more difficult when it could be seen as undermining those prospects.

The Saudis want to get out of a war they have felt trapped in for years. They have recently gone so far as to pressure the IRG into backing down from challenging the status of banks in Sanaa, even though such financial institutions, by definition, represent agents of terror finance. The international community wants to see humanitarian needs in Yemen alleviated, and it knows the Houthis will continue to weaponize the Yemeni humanitarian crisis to advance their interests. All of this begs the question: Is it possible to pursue peace in Yemen and deterrence in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb?

6. Recent US actions, including assembling a coalition with the UK and others to face down Iranian and Houthi aggression, indicates that will be the priority. And indeed, it must be. The right of shipping peacefully to transit international navigation routes is established and must be reinforced. The Houthis are not a recognized government, and attacking them proportionately is not an act of war against Yemen—indeed, there is no reason why their leadership should be any more exempt from targeting than those of the Islamic State or Al Qaeda.

Indicating to the Houthis that their challenge is too difficult to meet and them deigning to talk peace after nine years of brutalizing the Yemeni population is enough on its own to secure them latitude to indulge in international blackmail would be, in effect, to surrender to them. There is no guarantee that new UN talks will lead anywhere—so the Houthis could be told that those talks are welcomed for their own sake but are unrelated to maritime enforcement and that they will face severe kinetic consequences if their attacks continue.

The one proviso is that kinetic action should not damage critical infrastructure on the Yemeni coast, particularly the port of Hodeida, which is essential to commercial and humanitarian operations on which the well-being of so many Yemenis depend. We should, however, be looking again at the extent of the Houthis’ diversion and exploitation of humanitarian aid. We should also point out that the Houthis are themselves threatening Yemenis with starvation by deterring shipping from approaching Hodeida. The Houthis impose a tax on humanitarian aid that enters territory they control from IRG territory. But that is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to dismiss the idea of diverting more aid via Aden and other IRG-controlled ports.

I should also add that during my time as ambassador, there was an endless series of incidents where Iran was accused of arming the Houthis. This state of affairs was always denied, and it was hard to gain international consensus on it, though we had solid evidence. There was also reciprocity: during the Houthi advance across Yemen in 2015, we saw them prioritize releasing prisoners of interest to Iran. There is no doubt of the technical, financial, and logistical support the Houthis have enjoyed from both Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. And now, we see this clearly in Iran’s support for Houthi aggression in the Red Sea, including with the Behshad. This brings me to my final point, the elephant in the room: At what point do we hold Iran directly accountable for the asymmetric warfare they have been waging on us?

The matter became acute not because of any Houthi action but because of the killing of US troops in Jordan by an Iranian proxy attack. The Biden administration again raised the stakes, striking a range of Iran-associated targets in Iraq and Syria in addition to launching further strikes on the Houthis. But with Iran’s proxies persisting in anti-American attacks—especially if further US personnel are killed—the US is running out of road before it will be forced to impose direct consequences upon Iran. People have already asked why the Behshad was not sunk. Iran’s past conduct suggests sending an unmistakable but proportionate message does not need to lead to reckless Iranian escalation. Iran is a rational actor. For example, in late December, India deployed ships to warn Iran off any further disruption of Indian Ocean shipping lanes, and Iran backed down.

One hesitates to advocate for military action, but it now seems possible that Iran will simply continue to escalate until it is forced to back down by firmer pushback. It will only recalculate its risk appetite if it now faces severe, targeted penalties for its aggression, coupled with a clear message that there will be more to come if necessary. It is profoundly to be hoped that the current US response, sending military assets to the region, will deter Iran, Hezbollah, the Iraqi militias, and the Houthis from further escalation. The tentative conclusion must be that Iran remains a rational actor, but it has not yet been faced with severe enough consequences to back down from its continuing campaign against Israel and Western interests. It is essential to re-establish deterrence if we are not to stumble into a regional war.

Edmund Fitton-Brown is a senior advisor to the Counter Extremism Project. He formerly served as British ambassador to Yemen and as a coordinator of the UN Security Council’s Monitoring Team for ISIS, AQ, and the Taliban.

Tags: houthis, Iran, Iran-Houthis