Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te has just completed his first 100 days in office, giving observers a taste of what the next 1,360 days will bring.

Many of the political dynamics playing out in his first months in office were foreseen, have precedent in the past, and will continue into the future. The power split between the president and the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan, China’s intensifying political and military coercion, and sustained U.S. support are dominant features that will persist. Dynamic external risks could emerge, however, making Lai’s future more challenging than his first 100 days.

As one would expect, the view and degree of satisfaction with Lai’s 100 days so far differ considerably in Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. How one perceives Lai’s performance and the status quo is a Rorschach test, revealing as much about the observer as it does about his administration.

The Lai Administration Is Happy

Lai’s transition was smooth, the first intra-party transfer of power since democratic elections began in 1996. His cabinet contains a mix of his close allies and veterans from the Tsai Ing-wen administration. Not needing to change the curtains in his office to the Democratic Progressive Party’s hallmark shade of green, he quickly built on Tsai’s foundation.

Lai has plenty to be happy about. He can point to domestic political victories and international relations accomplishments. He should be happy about opinion polls showing his trust and approval ratings close to or over 50 percent. Domestically, things seem to be going Lai’s way.

Social and defense spending are growing in Lai’s budget, which should boost public confidence and his polls. Taiwanese companies are steadily transitioning away from China, re-shoring at home and off-shoring in Southeast Asia, avoiding risks from China’s politics and economic slowdown. Lai is promising major investments in AI, semiconductors, green energy, and human capital development to ensure Taiwan remains at the forefront of the global technology economy. The government predicts a sustained four-year gross domestic product growth rate around 3 percent, inflation below 2 percent, and unemployment around 3 percent.

Lai set an agenda to proactively addressed key issues. He established and chairs three committees in the presidential office: the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee, the National Climate Change Response Committee, and the Whole-of-Society Resilience Committee. He personally cares about these issues and recognizes voters’ interest in them. The resilience committee is part of a comprehensive response to Taiwan’s vulnerability to natural disasters, as well as the military threat from China. Long accused of under-investing in its own defense and ignoring the ramifications of a blockade or invasion, the government is seeking to reduce apathy and the public’s sense of hopelessness in the face of China’s pressure. The government has provided funding and support for a dramatic TV series airing next year, “Zero Day” depicting the apocalyptic scenario the Taiwanese could face in the event that China decides to attack Taiwan. Besides increasing public support for the island’s self-defense, the whole-of-society resilience campaign seeks to synchronize government efforts and ensure that resilience and homeland defense are an element of every department’s strategy and budget.

Lai deftly handled his first political challenge from the opposition Kuomintang, which leveraged their majority in the Legislative Yuan to pass a bill to increase the legislature’s power over the executive branch. Lai signed the bill, then applied for a legal injunction and handed the case to the constitutional court to rule on its constitutionality. Lai instantly established himself as the guardian of the Republic of China constitution, just as he pledged in his inauguration address a month earlier, leaving the Kuomintang opposition flat-footed. A carefully orchestrated grass-roots information campaign ensured broad Democratic Progressive Party support for Lai’s move, winning over party voters holding reservations about the Republic of China constitution due to its associations with mainland China. Lai has won the first round of jousting with the Kuomintang, but there will undoubtedly be many more to come.

Lai should be happy with his accomplishments in international diplomacy and managing the cross-Strait relationship. Nearly 50 high-level international delegations have visited Taipei since his inauguration, including a July summit of 49 lawmakers from the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China. Joint statements at the G7, and summits involving the United States, Japan, E.U., and others have included statements calling for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Lai even chalked up a diplomatic win in June when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi thanked Lai on X for his congratulations following India’s elections, highlighting Taiwan’s growing economic and technology ties with India.

The Lai administration should also be satisfied with their initial efforts to manage cross-Strait crises. Lai rallied international support in response to China’s June announcement of judicial guidelines to punish Taiwan independence “diehards,” including the death penalty. In July, Taiwan authorities negotiated the end to a standoff with China’s Coast Guard near Kinmen that was sparked by the February deaths of two mainland fishermen in an unregistered skiff. Beijing is certain to generate more crises for Lai to manage, because Beijing is not as happy as Lai.

Beijing Is Not Happy

General Secretary Xi Jinping is not happy with Lai’s first 100 days. If Xi is not happy, nobody in Beijing can be happy. Beijing has longstanding apprehensions about Lai, who referred to himself in 2017 as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence.” Lai’s election was a referendum on the Taiwanese people’s rejection of closer ties with China, leaving Beijing pundits to self-soothe by asserting that Lai won with only 40 percent of the votes (without admitting it was a three-way race). Beijing’s discontent with Lai fixated on the contradictions in his inauguration speech, affirming support for the Republic of China constitution that links the republic to mainland China, but Lai failed to acknowledge the 1992 consensus, repeatedly mentioned “Taiwan,” and asserted that “the Republic of China and People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.” Beijing commentators and the People’s Liberation Army reacted viscerally to Lai’s speech and “new two-state theory” with angry rhetoric and military exercises.

The steady increase in Chinese military operations around Taiwan reflects Beijing’s frustration and complete policy stagnation. Beijing is unable to respond to changing circumstances and remains fettered to military threats and old concepts such as the 1992 consensus. The people on Taiwan, in turn, increasingly oppose unification and self-identify as Taiwanese, rather than Chinese. Unwilling to engage in dialogue with Taipei unless they recognize Beijing’s one China principle, Beijing increasingly relies on military and political coercion. While coercion may serve as an effective signal to Chinese citizens, it persuades no one on Taiwan of the benefits of peaceful unification. The Peoples’ Liberation Army is the most called upon but least effective of China’s policy tools, underscoring Beijing’s failure.

Recently, a respected Chinese government–connected scholar privately expressed his frustrations to me, observing that Taiwan and Washington both claim to support the current cross-Strait status quo, but Beijing sees the status quo steadily changing for the worse. Recognizing that Beijing’s strategy was failing, he also lamented that there was no prospect for a new approach from Beijing under Xi, unless he decides on his own to fundamentally, radically alter course — which the scholar concludes is improbable.

Is Washington Happy?

It is hard for Washington to be happy when cross-Strait tensions are high, but there are good reasons for the Biden administration and the next president to be happy about the current cross-Strait status quo.

So far, Lai has retained important aspects of his predecessor’s cross-Strait playbook. During Taiwan’s presidential campaign, the Biden administration took the initiative to establish contacts with all presidential candidates and their advisors, including Lai. That effort ensured Lai understands U.S. policies and preferences and enabled Washington to discern his goals, building a close channel of communication that has been sustained since he came into office. The channel has developed a degree of mutual trust, reducing fears in Washington that Lai would recklessly pursue an agenda that provokes Beijing. Lai is demonstrating that he can pursue Taiwan’s interests and preserve its autonomy and dignity without undermining cross-Strait stability, which is what Washington prizes most.

The significant, steady increase in Chinese military operations around Taiwan raise fears of an incident causing a conflict no one wants, especially Washington. While Lai can hardly be blamed for this coercion campaign, Washington’s interest remains reducing tensions. Washington has more sway with Lai — Beijing has none — leaving Washington to manage risks with Taipei. This leaves Washington facing a dilemma. On the one hand is its belief in Taiwan’s autonomy and right to self-determination; on the other is the prospect of appeasing Beijing in order to reduce tensions. Of course, appeasing China in turn risks the loss of regional influence and diminished credibility with allies. Tokyo’s concerns are Washington’s concerns, just as a Taiwan crisis is a Japan crisis.

Washington is quietly watching how Lai consolidates power within the Democratic Progressive Party, using the court to prosecute former vice premier Cheng Wen-tsan over corruption allegations dating to his tenure as Taoyuan City mayor. Cheng’s arrest reflects an intra-party political struggle between a pair of long-time rivals. The arrest and detention of Taiwan People’s Party chairman and former Taipei City Mayor Ko Wen-je on corruption charges, as well as a number of corruption cases involving Kuomintang officials have Lai’s critics protesting that he is using the judiciary to persecute rivals. Washington observers might worry that Lai is undermining the independence of the judicial system, particularly if prosecutors continue to target centrist Democratic Progressive Party leaders. Should the party under Lai lurch to the left and more aggressively pursue Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence, greater tensions with Beijing are certain. The Biden administration is unlikely to publicly voice concerns in the midst of an election, however, particularly because channels to express concerns directly to Lai are robust.

Are Lai’s First 100 Days a Preview of the Next 1,360?

For the most part, what we’ve seen is what we can continue to expect. There will be constants Lai can count on, but also some dynamic risks he should prepare for.

Beijing’s policy stagnation and intractability mean Lai probably will not face dramatic shifts from Beijing. He can focus on crisis management, defense, and resilience efforts to maintain cross-Strait stability. International support will be reliable if he can avoid being seen as the antagonist or cause of tensions — Beijing’s bombastic rhetoric about Lai rings hollow. U.S. interest in maintaining Taiwan’s prosperity and autonomy is bipartisan and unambiguous. Japan’s interests are also coalescing with U.S. ones.

The Kuomintang and the Taiwan People’s Party will continue to seek to frustrate Lai’s domestic agenda, but the rules are understood and respected by all sides and there are some overlapping interests, so domestic politics should be manageable for a seasoned politician like Lai.

Lai’s most dynamic risks are external. A global economic downturn, trade protectionism, or other exogenous shocks could weaken Taiwan’s economy, causing Lai’s relatively high approval ratings to fall — a common problem with good poll numbers.

The next U.S. administration will undoubtedly support Taiwan, but both candidates bring uncertainty. Donald Trump’s transactionalism introduces the risk that he trades away Taiwan’s interests in a bargain with China, much as Richard Nixon did. A Kamala Harris administration could be inwardly focused on domestic issues, overly deliberative, and unsure, prioritizing the avoidance of friction with Beijing over consequential, demonstrative actions to support Taiwan.

It is improbable, but Beijing could unexpectedly change its approach. New carrots could be a bigger challenge to Lai than more of the same sticks. Economic incentives (or their removal) have failed to convince Taiwanese to support unification, but Beijing could discover that reassurances create more dilemmas for Lai than endless threats. The mother of all political risks from Beijing could be Xi’s unplanned retirement. Without an anointed successor or agreed-to norms for succession, a chaotic power transition in Beijing presents major risks for both Taipei and Washington.

Just over a month into his administration, Lai adopted a three-legged shelter dog, heeding Harry Truman’s advice that your only friend in politics is your dog. Lai Ching-te will undoubtedly face both expected and unexpected challenges in his first term. He will need a friend he can count on.

Drew Thompson was the director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2011 to 2018. He is now a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He can be followed on Twitter: @TangAnZhu.

Image: Office of the President, Taiwan via Wikimedia Commons