This week, United States Senator Rand Paul (R-Kentucky) unveiled the Risky Research Review Act, which would create an impartial security panel to examine and authorize “high-risk life sciences research” proposals that are applying for government funding.

The first-of-its-kind plan would provide “oversight over life sciences research funding throughout the federal government to guard public health, safety, and national security” by establishing a Life Sciences Research Security Board inside the executive branch.

“We could have stopped the COVID pandemic 10 years ago if this bill had been in place.”

“High-risk life sciences research” in this act includes “gain of function research,” “research involving genetic mods or synthetic creation of a possible pandemic pathogen,” and “activities involving the surveillance of potential pandemic pathogens.” It also includes any other research that might have a dual use and could put public health at risk.

Only with the consent of the majority of the security board members will applicants wishing to carry out research projects falling under this category be eligible to receive government financing.

Five non-governmental scientists, two national security specialists, and an executive director would make up the nine-member board, which the president would nominate with Senate consent. Members may serve two four-year terms and have not been employed by the federal government for the previous three years. According to the proposed statute, the security board would be required to provide yearly reports online to both Congress and the public.

The U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and Homeland Security convened an oversight hearing on “taxpayer-financed high-risk viral research” on Thursday morning.

Senator Gary Peters (D-Mich.) appeared to indicate during his opening remarks on Thursday morning’s hearing that he might not be against legislation like Paul’s measure.

“Our expert witnesses brought up the necessity of strong control across a broad spectrum of high-risk life sciences research, both domestically and internationally,” Peters said. “Research in the life sciences can be vital to safeguarding both national security and public health. It advances vaccination research, enhances diagnostic procedures, and deepens our comprehension of possible biological dangers.”

“This kind of study carries a high risk. It exposes scientists to dangerous infections, and occasionally it fails to provide them with the training they need to manage them safely,” Peters continued. “There might be major health concerns for the general population if researchers make an innocent error or if equipment malfunctions.”

“Over the last four years, overwhelming evidence has surfaced establishing the lab origin of the pandemic and unraveling a web of deception: the enormous COVID cover-up,” Paul said in his opening remarks.

“So, what steps have been taken since it was revealed that our government is, with little to no supervision, sponsoring risky viral research abroad? Paul said, “The answer is bleak and terrifying: almost nothing. “It is our responsibility to confront the status quo in the dystopian environment we find ourselves in, to expose the murkiest areas of government operations, and to defend the liberties and lives of the people we serve.”

Wolinetz supported the federal government’s management of research involving dangerous pathogens.

Wolinetz asserted, “Taken as a whole, this policy framework undoubtedly constitutes the most stringent supervision of pathogen research in the world, even though it may be incomplete and should continue to change with the science and current threat situation.” “We will be less prepared for the next emergent biological danger if we make it difficult for scientists to perform and share the results of studies that increase our knowledge of infections.”

The financing of this kind of research now “lacks proper government control, allowing American taxpayer funds to be squandered without necessary checks,” according to a news statement the committee released introducing the Risky Research Review Act.

Redfield referred to the proposed act as “a very significant law” with the aim of prioritizing national security in U.S. life science funding decisions. He demanded a halt to studies on gain-of-function.

Redfield said, “We could have stopped the COVID pandemic 10 years ago if this bill had been in place.”